Digital Commons @ University of Georgia
School of Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

12-1-2008

Environmental Law, Eleventh Circuit Survey
Travis M. Trimble
University of Georgia, ttrimble@uga.edu

Repository Citation
Travis M. Trimble, Environmental Law, Eleventh Circuit Survey (2008),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/806

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University
of Georgia School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Environmental Law
by Travis M. Trimble*
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided
cases in 2008 that addressed the scope of agency discretion in several
contexts. In an issue of first impression under the Clean Air Act
(CAA),1 the court held that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
properly exercised its discretion in not objecting to the issuance of an
operating permit to a power company that the agency had earlier
formally accused of violating the CAA.2 In another case, the court held
that the Federal Emergency Management Agency had the discretion to
protect endangered species while administering the National Flood
Insurance Act3 and thus was required to comply with the Endangered
Species Act4 to ensure that its actions did not jeopardize endangered
species.5 In a case involving the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA),6 the court held that the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida had not afforded the EPA the proper
deference in reviewing the agency’s Environmental Impact Statement
prepared pursuant to NEPA, and the agency’s subsequent decision to
issue Clean Water Act7 permits allowing mining in wetlands.8 The
court also held that the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in
issuing a final rule altering the obligations of operators of underground
injection wells under the Safe Drinking Water Act.9 Finally, the court

* Instructor, University of Georgia School of Law. Mercer University (B.A., 1986);
University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill (M.A., 1988); University of Georgia School of Law
(J.D., 1993).
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006).
2. Sierra Club v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2008).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129 (2006).
4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
5. Florida Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133, 1144 (11th Cir. 2008).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2006).
7. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
8. Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 2008).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (2006); Miami-Dade County v. EPA, 529 F.3d 1049, 1071 (11th
Cir. 2008).
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held that the government’s remediation plan at a federal facility that
had not been listed on the National Priorities List was selected pursuant
to provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act10 that deprived the federal district court of
jurisdiction to hear a citizen suit challenging the sufficiency of the
plan.11
I.

CLEAN AIR ACT

In Sierra Club v. Johnson,12 in an issue of first impression, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the EPA had discretion not to object to the
Georgia Environmental Protection Division’s (EPD) issuance of a Clean
Air Act (CAA)13 Title V operating permit to a power company when the
EPA had previously issued a notice of violation and filed a civil
enforcement action against the power company for alleged violations of
the CAA.14
The CAA creates a comprehensive regulatory scheme to prevent and
control air pollution.15 Under Title V of the CAA, every major source
of air pollution must obtain an operating permit specific to that
source.16 The permit sets out emissions limits and monitoring requirements for that source.17 An operating permit may also include limits
for the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) of air quality in
certain geographical areas of the country; however, sources in existence
as of August 7, 1977, are not required to comply with PSD limits.18
In states in which the EPA has delegated permitting authority, such
as Georgia, the state issues Title V operating permits, but the EPA
retains the right (and the duty) to object to state-issued permits that do
not comply with the CAA.19 The EPA itself may challenge a permit, or,
if the EPA does not object to a permit, any person may challenge this
decision by petitioning the EPA.20 In this circumstance, the CAA
provides that “ ‘[t]he Administrator [of the EPA] shall issue an objection

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
OSI, Inc. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1294, 1299 (11th Cir. 2008).
541 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2008).
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006).
Sierra Club, 541 F.3d at 1259.
Id. at 1260 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006)).
Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Johnson, 436 F.3d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 2006)).
Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Ga. Power Co., 443 F.3d 1346, 1348-49 (11th Cir. 2006)).
Id. at 1260-61.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b) (2006).
Id.
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. . . if the petitioner demonstrates to the Administrator that the permit
is not in compliance with the requirements of [the CAA].’ ”21
At issue in this case were operating permits issued by the Georgia
EPD to two of Georgia Power Company’s electric generating plants:
Bowen and Scherer.22 Georgia Power added two steam emission units
to Plant Scherer in the 1970s and modified a boiler at Plant Bowen in
the 1990s without obtaining operating permits that applied PSD limits
to the plants. In 1999 the EPA issued a notice of violation to Georgia
Power, stating that these upgrades constituted major modifications to
the plants that triggered the PSD requirements. Georgia Power did not
correct the alleged violations, and in the same year, the EPA filed a civil
enforcement action seeking an injunction and penalties. Georgia Power
answered, contending that the units at Scherer were exempt from PSD
requirements because Georgia Power began construction on the units in
1974. Additionally, Georgia Power contended that the Bowen modifications had not resulted in net emission increases and therefore were not
major modifications. The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia administratively closed the enforcement action
pending a decision from a multidistrict litigation panel relevant to the
issues raised by the parties. In 2002 the court denied without prejudice
a motion by the United States to reopen the case. Subsequently, the
United States did not attempt to reopen the case.23
In 2004 Georgia Power applied for—and the EPD issued—renewed
Title V permits for the plants without including PSD requirements. The
EPA did not object to the renewed permits. The petitioners petitioned
the EPA to object to the permits, basing their challenge on the EPA’s
earlier violation notice and civil enforcement action.24 The EPA denied
the petition, concluding that the violation notice and civil enforcement
action were not conclusive evidence of a CAA violation but merely
“initial steps in the process” of determining whether a violation had
occurred.25 Thus, the EPA concluded that it had the discretion not to
object to the permits because the petitioners failed to sufficiently
demonstrate that the permits were not in compliance with the CAA.26
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the agency’s denial of the petition,
holding that the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in concluding
that the petitioners had not demonstrated that the permits were not in

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Sierra Club, 541 F.3d at 1261 (ellipsis in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(2)).
See id. at 1259-60.
Id. at 1262.
Id. at 1262-63.
Id. at 1263.
Id.
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compliance with the CAA.27 First, the court agreed with the EPA that
the second prong of the CAA’s permit review provision,28 which requires
the EPA to object to a permit “ ‘if the petitioner demonstrates . . . that
the permit is not in compliance with the . . . [CAA],’ ”29 is both discretionary and ambiguous: the EPA must judge whether a petitioner has
demonstrated noncompliance, and neither the CAA nor its regulations
define the term “demonstrates.”30 Thus, the court concluded that it
must defer to the EPA’s judgment that the petitioners failed to
demonstrate noncompliance so long as the agency’s decision was
reasonable.31
Second, the court determined that the EPA’s interpretation was
reasonable.32 The petitioners’ only evidence that the Georgia Power
permits were not in compliance with the CAA was the EPA’s 1999 notice
of violation and subsequent civil enforcement action.33 The court noted
that, under the CAA, the EPA could issue a notice of violation based on
“ ‘any information available’” to the agency, such as, “‘a staff report,
newspaper clipping, [or] anonymous phone tip,’ ”—a standard the court
described as “exceedingly low.”34 Thus, a notice of violation would not
necessarily indicate that a violation had occurred.35
Furthermore, the court concluded that the dormant civil enforcement
action did not necessarily demonstrate the permits’ noncompliance.36
The court noted that the EPA’s allegations in the action were “fiercely
contested” by Georgia Power and that there had been no determination
on the merits of the case.37 The court acknowledged that by denying
the petition of the petitioners, the EPA had put itself “in the peculiar
position of defending its decision not to object to the operating permits
without backing away from its violation notice or enforcement action,”38
but the court concluded nonetheless that the agency’s decision was
reasonable.39

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 1269.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(2).
Sierra Club, 541 F.3d at 1265 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(2)).
Id. at 1266-67.
Id. at 1267.
See id. at 1267-69.
Id. at 1267.
Id. (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1269.
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The court also acknowledged (but rejected) the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit’s reasoning in New York Public Interest
Research Group, Inc. v. Johnson,40 that reached the opposite conclusion.41 In Johnson the Second Circuit held that the petitioners’
evidence, which consisted of a state-issued violation notice and a pending
civil enforcement action, was sufficient to demonstrate to the EPA that
the permits at issue did not comply with the CAA.42 According to the
Eleventh Circuit, the Second Circuit based its holding on four rationales:
first, the agency must make a finding that a violation of the CAA
occurred before issuing a notice of violation; second, an agency’s civil
enforcement complaint is more significant than other complaints because
of procedures undertaken by the agency before issuing the complaint;
third, the agency is in a “ ‘privileged position to monitor and regulate’ ”
permitees and thus could claim to be uncertain of which permit
requirements applied; and fourth, private parties should not be required
to duplicate an agency’s findings of noncompliance.43
The Eleventh Circuit was not persuaded by these arguments.44 First,
it explained that the agency’s findings to support a notice of violation
could be supported by “any information available,” which as the court
already noted, was a low standard of proof.45 Second, the court refused
to distinguish an agency complaint from any other because, as with all
complaints, “the allegations it contains must be proven.”46 Third, in
addressing the agency’s “privileged position” to monitor permittees, the
court explained that the agency was also in a privileged position to
assess “the current strength of its case” in evaluating whether the issue
had been resolved.47 Finally, the court challenged the Second Circuit’s
reasoning that a private petitioner should not be required to duplicate
an investigation already made by the agency.48 According to the court,
allowing a private petitioner merely to rely on an agency-issued notice
of violation would “render meaningless” the statutory provision’s
directive that the petitioner “demonstrate” noncompliance.49 Further,
the court added that “[h]ad Congress intended the Administrator to
object to an operating permit every time a violation notice is issued, it

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

427 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2005).
See Sierra Club, 541 F.3d at 1268.
Id. (citing Johnson, 427 F.3d at 180).
Id. (quoting Johnson, 427 F.3d at 181).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1268-69.
Id.
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could have easily made that an explicit part of the . . . permit review
process. It did not.”50 In reaching its conclusion, the court expressly
did not attempt “to define precisely the burdens facing a petitioner”
under the CAA permit review provision.51
II.

ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

In Florida Key Deer v. Paulison,52 the Eleventh Circuit held that
FEMA had discretion to protect endangered species in administering the
National Flood Insurance Act (NFIA);53 therefore, the agency was
subject to § 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA),54 which
requires federal agencies to ensure that their actions do not jeopardize
endangered or threatened species or their critical habitats.55 The court
also held that FEMA’s “community rating system,” which awarded
communities with credits and reduced insurance rates for voluntarily
adopting a habitat conservation plan, did not fulfill the agency’s
obligation under § 7(a)(1) of the ESA,56 requiring federal agencies to
carry out conservation programs to further the purposes of the ESA.57
The NFIA authorizes FEMA to provide low-cost flood insurance
throughout the United States through the National Flood Insurance
Program (the Program).58 To be eligible for the Program, a community
must demonstrate a positive interest in obtaining flood insurance and
must adopt “adequate land use and control measures that are consistent
with the comprehensive criteria for land management and use developed
by FEMA pursuant to [the NFIA].”59 FEMA is charged with developing
those criteria, which must ensure that localities receiving flood insurance
through the Program must, among other things, “‘improve the longrange land management and use of flood-prone areas.’ ”60 The NFIA
also requires FEMA to establish a community rating system that
provides discounts on insurance premiums in communities that establish
floodplain management regulations beyond the minimum eligibility
criteria.61

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 1269 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1266.
522 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2008).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129 (2006).
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
Florida Key Deer, 522 F.2d at 1143.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (2006).
Florida Key Deer, 522 F.2d at 1146-47.
Id. at 1136 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4011 (2006)).
Id. at 1137 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 4102(c), 4022(a) (2006)).
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4102(c)).
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4022(b) (2006)).
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The ESA, administered in relevant part by the Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS), provides for the protection of endangered and threatened
species (Listed Species) and their habitats.62 To this end, § 7(a)(1) of
the ESA provides that all federal agencies “ ‘shall . . . utilize their
authorities in furtherance of the purposes of [the ESA] by carrying out
programs for the conservation of [Listed Species].”63 Section 7(a)(2) of
the ESA, further provides that every federal agency shall “‘insure [sic]
that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is
not likely to jeopardize . . . [Listed Species or their critical habitats].’”64
A joint regulation of the departments responsible for administering the
ESA65 in effect during the pendency of the case provides that section
7 of the ESA applies to all federal agency actions “ ‘in which there is
discretionary Federal involvement or control.’”66
ESA regulations provide for a process by which a federal agency
contemplating action that may affect a Listed Species or its habitat must
consult with the FWS regarding such action.67 If the FWS believes
that the agency’s action will jeopardize a Listed Species or its habitat,
then it must issue an opinion detailing how the federal agency’s action
will do so and suggest alternatives that the agency can take to avoid
such a threat.68 Upon receipt of the FWS’s opinion, the agency may
choose to terminate its action, adopt the alternatives recommended by
the FWS, or seek a cabinet-level exemption.69
The events giving rise to Florida Key Deer began in 1984 when the
FWS first determined that FEMA’s administration of the Program in the
Florida Keys jeopardized the existence of the Florida Key deer, a Listed
Species, by authorizing development that destroyed the deer’s habitat.
In 1989 FEMA refused the FWS’s request for a consultation, asserting
that the ESA did not apply to the Program. In 1990 the plaintiffs,
composed of various wildlife organizations, filed suit on behalf of the
deer and obtained an injunction from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida requiring FEMA to consult with the
FWS regarding the Program’s impact on the Listed Species. Following
the consultation, in 1997 the FWS issued its opinion that FEMA’s
administration of the Program jeopardized the deer, along with eight

62.
Id. at
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See id. at 1137-38. The FWS’s administration of the ESA is at issue in this case.
1138 n.2.
Id. at 1138 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1)).
Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)).
The Department of the Interior and the Department Commerce.
Florida Key Deer, 522 F.2d at 1141 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2008)).
Id. at 1138.
Id. at 1139.
Id.
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other Listed Species, and recommended alternatives. Those alternatives
included the FWS reviewing new developments in Monroe County,
Florida—the area at issue—for compliance with the ESA, and FEMA
developing an incentive program to provide lower premiums within the
county in return for the county’s development of a habitat conservation
plan.70
The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, contending that the
alternatives proposed by the FWS would not prevent FEMA’s Program
from jeopardizing the Listed Species, which was a violation of § 7(a)(2).
Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that the conservation program
adopted by FEMA did not satisfy § 7(a)(1). In 2005 the district court
granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on these two claims
and enjoined FEMA from issuing flood insurance for new developments
in the Listed Species’ habitat until it brought the Program into
compliance with the ESA.71
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that § 7(a)(2) of the ESA, which
requires federal agencies to ensure that their actions do not jeopardize
Listed Species, applied to FEMA’s administration of the Program
because FEMA had the discretion to protect Listed Species in administering the Program.72 The court noted that during the pendency of the
appeal, the United States Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
regulation construing the scope of § 7 of the ESA.73 The Supreme
Court held that under the regulation, an agency is subject to the
requirement of § 7(a)(2) of the ESA if the agency has the discretion in
taking a particular action “ ‘to consider the protection of threatened or
endangered species as an end in itself.’ ”74
Applying this standard, the Eleventh Circuit noted that pursuant to
FEMA’s enabling legislation,75 the agency develops the criteria to
determine whether communities are eligible for flood insurance under
the Program.76 In doing so, FEMA is directed to, among other things,
encourage state and local governments to adopt planning measures to
“ ‘improve the long-range land management and use of flood-prone

70. Id. at 1139-40.
71. Id. at 1140.
72. Id. at 1142-43.
73. Id. at 1141 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct.
2518 (2007)).
74. Id. (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2537).
75. FEMA’s enabling legislation is the National Flood Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 90448, 82 Stat. 572 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129 (2006)). See
Florida Key Deer, 522 F.3d at 1142.
76. Florida Key Deer, 522 F.3d at 1142.
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areas.’”77 Thus, the court held that FEMA has “broad discretion” to
develop eligibility criteria under this directive, including the discretion
to consider the protection of Listed Species.78
Additionally, the court held that § 7(a)(1) of the ESA imposed an
affirmative obligation on FEMA to develop a species conservation
program as part of its administration of the Program in the Florida
Keys.79 The court reasoned that FEMA’s community rating system,
whereby communities voluntarily electing to participate could develop
conservation programs in exchange for lower insurance rates, amounted
to “total inaction,” which was not permitted under the ESA.80 The
court noted that in the nine years FEMA had offered the program, no
community had elected to participate.81 The court declined to define
the scope of FEMA’s discretion in developing a conservation program
under § 7(a)(1), holding only that FEMA had a “baseline requirement”
to develop some program, which it had not done.82
III.

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT

In Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp,83 the Eleventh Circuit held that the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida failed
to grant the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) the proper level of
deference in deciding issues raised by the plaintiffs’ National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)84 and Clean Water Act (CWA)85 claims.86
A group of mining companies owned a substantial portion of a 60,000acre area of wetlands east of Everglades National Park and northwest
of Miami, in southern Florida. At the mining companies’ request, in the
late 1990s the Corps began investigating the possibility of issuing CWA
permits, which would allow mining in a 15,800-acre tract for fifty years.
In 1999 the Corps issued a draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS),
pursuant to NEPA, in which the Corps recognized that the mining would
have serious negative environmental impacts.87 The draft EIS drew
extensive criticism during the public comment period, including criticism
from other federal agencies raising “serious environmental, technical,

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4102(c)).
Id.
Id. at 1146.
Id. at 1147.
Id.
Id. at 1146-47.
526 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2008).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d at 1359.
Id. at 1356-57.
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and legal concerns.”88 In 2000 the Corps issued a final EIS that
followed the draft EIS in recognizing that the mining would have an
“irreversible significant impact on the environmental resources of the
region.”89 The final EIS also proposed that some mitigation could be
required in the permits, including requiring the companies to purchase
and preserve wetlands adjacent to the proposed mining area. Following
the final EIS, the Corps gave public notice that it intended to issue the
permits.90
Following this notice, the Corps received additional information (1)
that mining would impact the Miami area’s primary source of drinking
water significantly more than the Corps anticipated in its EIS and (2)
that the Corps’ mitigation requirement to purchase and preserve
wetlands was cost-prohibitive to the companies because of rising
property values in areas adjacent to the mining area. As a result, the
Corps decided to issue ten-year mining permits covering only five
thousand acres. The Corps refused to draft a supplemental EIS.
Instead, the Corps issued a Record of Decision concluding that mining
in the more limited area would have no significant impact on the
environment other than what was discussed in the original EIS, on
which the Corps based its initial decision to grant the permits.91
The plaintiffs (various public interest environmental groups) brought
suit, contending that the Corps’ decision to grant the permits was
arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).92 All parties moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the plaintiffs’ motion, vacating the permits.93
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded
the case.94 In its conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit offered no opinion on
whether the Corps complied with the necessary agencies during the
permit process, instructing the district court to answer this question by
applying the proper standard of review.95 By applying the proper
standard, the district court can determine whether the Corps’ decision
to grant the permits was arbitrary and capricious.96 The court first
noted that only two of the plaintiffs’ four claims against the Corps on
which the district court granted summary judgment could properly be

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 1357.
Id. at 1357 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
Id. at 1357.
Id.
5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596, 701-706 (2006).
Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d at 1356.
Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1363-64.
Id. at 1359.
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the basis of the district court’s order: (1) a claim based on the CWA
because the Corps improperly found that there were no practicable
alternatives to the permits as issued after weighing the benefits and
detriments of the project without holding a public hearing and (2) a
claim based on NEPA that the Corps failed to meet NEPA’s requirements in issuing the final EIS.97
First addressing the NEPA issue, the court reviewed an agency’s
duties under NEPA.98 An agency must first determine whether its
action constitutes a “‘major [f]ederal action,’” that is, one that “ ‘significantly affect[s] the quality of the human environment.’ ”99 If it is such
an action, the agency must prepare an EIS.100 If the agency subsequently learns new information revealing a significant environmental
effect that was not considered in preparing the initial EIS, it must issue
a supplemental EIS.101 However, if the agency takes “minimizing
measure[s]” in its responsive action to the new information, it is not
required to prepare a supplemental EIS if the environmental impacts of
the action fall within those already considered as part of the original
EIS.102
The court then framed the issues on appeal with regard to the NEPA
claim: (1) whether the Corps’ determination that the 10-year, 5,000-acre
permits would have no significant environmental impacts beyond those
considered in the original EIS was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse
of discretion; (2) whether the Corps’ determination that new information
regarding the possible contamination of Miami’s drinking water source
and the mining’s potentially detrimental impact on the wood stork did
not require a supplemental EIS was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse
of discretion; and (3) whether the original EIS complied with NEPA.103
The court noted that in reviewing whether an agency has met its
obligations under NEPA, a court must afford “substantial deference” to
the agency.104 Further, the court explained that “NEPA is procedural,

97. Id. The court held that the plaintiffs’ two other claims on which the district court
granted summary judgment, a claim against the Corps involving the ESA and a claim
against the FWS based on decisions that the two agencies made regarding the mining’s
impact on an endangered wood stork, were moot at the time the district court issued its
injunction. Id.
98. Id. at 1360.
99. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006)).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1361.
104. Id.
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setting forth no substantive limits on agency decision-making.”105
Thus, “NEPA can never provide grounds for a court to direct a federal
agency’s substantive decision.”106
Here, the court determined that the district court “frequently
condemned Corps actions based on simple disagreement, rather than
based on a finding that the actions violated the APA’s deferential
standard.”107 The court continued:
The district court’s NEPA analysis erroneously focuses on the Corps’s
decision to take the major Federal action—granting the permits—and
the adequacy of the mitigation measures on which the Corps conditioned the permits. Substantive issues like whether to grant the
permits and what mitigation conditions to adopt are irrelevant to
NEPA compliance.108

The court explained that NEPA cannot prohibit an agency from taking
an action, even in the face of clear negative impacts to the environment,
when the agency’s decision is based on its conclusion that the economic
or other benefits of taking the action outweigh any negative environmental impacts.109 Because the district court did not limit its review of the
Corps’ permitting decision to the proper scope, the court of appeals
vacated the plaintiffs’ summary judgment and remanded for proper
review.110
With regard to the CWA issue on appeal, and without discussing the
proper scope of review in detail, the court held that the district court’s
decision suffered from the “same pervasive lack of deference . . . . As
with its NEPA analysis, the court failed to view the CWA claims through
the deferential lens of the APA.”111 Thus, the court also vacated the
judgment on the CWA claim.112
IV.

SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT/ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

In Miami-Dade County v. EPA,113 the Eleventh Circuit upheld a
final rule114 issued by the EPA pursuant to the Safe Drinking Water

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)).
Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1361.
Id. at 1362 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1361-62.
Id. at 1362-63.
Id. at 1363.
Id.
529 F.3d 1049 (11th Cir. 2008).
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 146.15, 146.16 (2008).
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Act (SDWA).115 The court held that the plaintiffs had adequate notice
of the final rule because it was a “logical outgrowth” of the draft rule
despite differences between the draft rule and the final version.116 The
court further held that the EPA’s interpretation of the “endangerment”
standard117 of the SDWA as it was embodied in the final rule was not
arbitrary and capricious.118
The SDWA regulates the practice of the underground injection of
wastewater and, more specifically, protects underground sources of
drinking water from contamination.119 The SDWA provides that
underground injection of wastewater “endangers” drinking water sources
if such injection may result in the presence in underground water
which supplies . . . any public water system of any contaminant, and
if the presence of such contaminant may result in such system’s not
complying with any . . . primary drinking water regulation or may
otherwise adversely affect the health of persons.120

The EPA’s initial regulations implementing the SDWA prohibited the
movement of fluid containing any contaminant into an underground
drinking water source.121 The EPA allowed the state permitting
authorities to determine well-construction methods ensuring that this
“no-fluid-movement” standard was met.122 In the 1990s, however,
groundwater monitoring demonstrated that despite such methods, fluid
from underground wastewater injection wells was reaching drinking
water sources in Florida. Accordingly, in 2000 the EPA proposed a rule
revision to apply to all municipal waste disposal wells that could
contaminate drinking water sources. Under the draft rule, well
operators could either provide advance wastewater treatment and
disinfection coupled with a demonstration that any contaminants left
after treatment would not “endanger” a drinking water source or,
without providing advance treatment, could conduct a demonstration
showing that the well did not cause contamination of a drinking water
source.123
The EPA issued its final rule in 2005. Under the final rule, operators
of wells from which contaminant migration was occurring were required

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (2006); see Miami-Dade County, 529 F.3d at 1071.
Miami-Dade County, 529 F.3d at 1060.
See 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(2) (2006).
Miami-Dade County, 529 F.3d at 1067.
Id. at 1052.
42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(2).
Miami-Dade County, 529 F.3d at 1053.
Id.
Id. at 1054-55.

1206

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

within five years of the effective date of the rule to treat the wastewater
prior to injection.124 The EPA explained that the final rule was a
modified version of the first option under the draft rule and that the
“non-endangerment demonstration requirement had been eliminated”
because the treatment requirements under the new rule “would
necessarily eliminate any concern about [contaminants] remaining after
treatment.”125 The petitioners, the Sierra Club and various local
governments, challenged the final rule on several grounds, including lack
of notice of the rule’s content and the EPA’s allegedly arbitrary and
capricious interpretation of the “endangerment” definition in the
SDWA.126
The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition.127 First, regarding notice,
the Sierra Club challenged the elimination of the demonstration
requirement that had been in the draft rule.128 The court noted that
an agency may change a draft rule after the comment period without
conducting a further comment period so long as the final rule is a
“logical outgrowth” of the draft rule.129 However, the court explained
that “[n]otice is inadequate if ‘the interested parties could not reasonably
have anticipated the final rulemaking from the draft rule.’ ”130 Regarding the rule at issue, the court decided that the EPA’s adoption of the
higher pre-injection treatment standards in the final rule eliminated the
need for a demonstration by the well operator that the injected
wastewater would not cause contaminants to enter a drinking water
source.131 Thus, the court held that the final rule was a “logical
outgrowth” of the proposed rule.132
The petitioners also challenged the final rule on grounds related to the
EPA’s interpretation of the “non-endangerment” provision in the
SDWA.133 First, the Sierra Club contended that the rule was inconsistent with a “reasonable interpretation” of the provision because the rule
did not provide for treatment of nonbiological contaminants.134 The
court noted that the non-endangerment provision left the EPA with a

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
Cir. 1999)).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

1056.
1057.
1057-58.
1052.
1059.
1058.
1059 (quoting Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 182 F.3d 1261, 1276 (11th

at 1058-59.
at 1060.
at 1066.
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“gapfilling” role135 in determining when a possible migration of a
contaminant “‘may result’ ” in a regulatory violation or “ ‘may otherwise
adversely affect’ ” health.136 Thus, the EPA was entitled to deference
from the courts.137 The court noted that based on the record, the EPA
had considered whether nonbiological contaminants posed a risk to
drinking water sources and determined that under current waste
injection practices, they would not.138 Thus, the agency’s decision not
to require additional protective measures in the final rule was not
arbitrary and capricious.139
Second, the local government petitioners complained that the final rule
was arbitrarily too restrictive on well operators for several reasons.140
They argued that the rule failed to consider differences in hydrology and
geology as required by the SDWA.141 The court again applied a
deferential review and concluded that the EPA had properly considered
evidence and tailored the rule geographically to apply to the geological
regions of Florida most likely to be affected by migrating contaminants.142 The local government petitioners also claimed that the final
rule was not supported by the EPA’s risk assessment because the
methodology was flawed in four respects.143 As to each claim, the
court concluded that the EPA had made rationally supported assumptions in its methodology.144 Finally, the court concluded that the final
rule was based on a reasonable interpretation of the SDWA.145
V.

COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION,
LIABILILTY ACT

AND

In OSI, Inc. v. United States,146 the Eleventh Circuit held that under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

135. Id. at 1063 (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(2)).
137. See id.
138. Id. at 1066-67.
139. Id. at 1067.
140. See id. at 1068-69.
141. Id. at 1068.
142. Id. at 1068-69.
143. Id. at 1069. The petitioners claimed that the methodology “(1) fail[ed] to consider
the concentration of contaminants already in the aquifers, (2) fail[ed] to employ a
quantitative probabilistic risk analysis methodology, (3) fail[ed] to consider the results of
a then-unpublished University of Miami study of well-disposal practices, and (4) [made]
faulty assumptions about contaminant plumes.” Id.
144. Id. at 1069-70.
145. Id. at 1071.
146. 525 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2008).
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Liability Act (CERCLA),147 a remedial action being conducted at a
federal facility, when the EPA has not placed the facility on the National
Priorities List (NPL), is conducted pursuant to § 9604 of CERCLA148
rather than § 9620.149 Because § 9613150 deprives federal courts of
jurisdiction to decide challenges to ongoing remedial actions brought
under § 9604, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama did not have jurisdiction over the plaintiff ’s Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)151 citizen suit regarding the facility.152
In this case, the plaintiff, OSI, owned property that had been leased
by the Air Force from its previous owners and used as a landfill in the
1960s and 1970s. In the late 1990s, the Air Force discovered contamination on the property that required remediation under CERCLA. In
response, the Air Force selected a remediation plan that consisted
primarily of long-term groundwater monitoring plus protective fencing
and hydrogen-releasing compound barriers. The plaintiff brought
several claims, including the RCRA citizen suit claim seeking an
injunction requiring removal of all contaminants.153 The district court
granted summary judgment to the Air Force. Regarding the RCRA
claim, the district court ruled that the plaintiff failed to show a genuine
issue of material fact regarding the citizen-suit requirement that the
contamination at issue posed an imminent and substantial threat to
health or the environment.154
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not
have jurisdiction to decide the RCRA claim.155 The court noted that
under CERCLA, remedial actions conducted by the government are
typically selected pursuant to § 9604.156 Accordingly, § 9613157 provides that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear challenges to
an ongoing remedial action selected pursuant to § 9604.158 However,

147. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (2006).
149. OSI, Inc., 525 F.3d at 1299; 42 U.S.C. § 9620 (2006).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (2006).
151. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992K (2006).
152. OSI, Inc., 525 F.3d at 1299.
153. Id. at 1296-97. The court determined that the plaintiffs’ other claims were without
merit, id. at 1297, and discussed only the RCRA claim in detail, see id. at 1297-99.
154. Id. at 1297.
155. Id. at 1299.
156. Id. at 1298. Section 9604 authorizes the President “ ‘to act . . . to remove or
arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to [any] hazardous substance.’ ” OSI, Inc., 525 F.3d at 1298 (ellipsis in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1)).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (2006).
158. OSI, Inc., 525 F.3d at 1297-98 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2006)).
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§ 9620159 applies to federal facilities and is not subject to the § 9613
jurisdictional bar.160 Section 9620 directs the responsible government
department and the EPA to assess contamination at the site and
determine whether to include the site on the NPL.161 It further
provides that after a facility has been included on the NPL, the
government shall conduct a remediation assessment, which may lead to
remedial action.162 The court recognized that under § 9620, the
government has no authority to conduct a remedial action at a facility
unless and until the facility has been placed on the NPL.163
The plaintiff ’s property had not been placed on the NPL.164 Thus,
the court concluded that the Air Force had authority to select a remedial
plan for the property only under § 9604, meaning the district court did
not have jurisdiction over the plaintiff ’s RCRA suit.165 The court
expressed no opinion on whether a remedial action at a federal facility
on the NPL would be selected under § 9620 and thus avoid the
jurisdictional bar.166

159. 42 U.S.C. § 9620 (2006).
160. OSI, Inc., 525 F.3d at 1298 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9620).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1298-99.
164. Id. at 1299.
165. Id.
166. Id. The court noted that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that challenges to remedial actions at federal facilities are not subject to the
jurisdictional bar. Id. (citing Fort Ord Toxics Project, Inc. v. Cal. EPA, 189 F.3d 828 (9th
Cir. 1999) (the facility at issue in Fort Ord had been placed on the NPL).

